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IN DEFENSE OF THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT
IN AGGRAVATED CIRCUMSTANCES
C. Eric Davis*
The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) affords various protections to Indian families
throughout child welfare proceedings. Among them is the duty imposed upon the state to
provide rehabilitative services to families prior to the outplacement of an Indian child, or
termination of parental rights. An analogous provision for non-Indians in the Adoption and
Safe Families Act (ASFA) excuses rehabilitative services in "aggravated circumstances" of
child abuse. The ICWA contains no such exception, and that absence has been controversial.
In 2002, the Alaska Supreme Court applied ASFA's aggravated circumstances exception to
the ICWA, thereby excusing services when a father severely abused his three Native children.
In 2005, the South Dakota Supreme Court addressed the same issue, but expressly refused
to engrafi such an exception into the ICWA. This Note defends South Dakota's position on
policy grounds. It chiefly argues that an aggravated circumstances exception would do violence
to the ICWA and its family preservation goals, and further that such an exception is
unnecessary to protect Native children from dangerous parents.
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INTRODUCTION
When a child is removed from her home for neglect or abuse, the
State must provide remedial services to the child's parents.' These services
seek to address the problems that caused the child to be removed in the
first place, and can range anywhere from alcohol recovery support to fi-
nancial management services.2 For cases involving non-Indians, these
services are governed by the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act
(ASFA), and are called "reasonable efforts."3 In cases involving Indian
children, however, reunification services are mandated by the Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA), and are called "active efforts." 4
Now consider a troubling scenario. A father has been convicted of
severe sexual abuse of his three sons, and sentenced to nineteen years in
prison. The three boys are promptly put in the custody of the State, which
then moves to terminate the father's parental rights. The State argues that
no reunification services are necessary since the family has been irrecon-
cilably sundered by sexual abuse. The father, however, argues that the State
must still provide rehabilitative services to attempt to maintain his family.
So now what? The State will be excused from offering services,
right? If the three boys are non-Indian, then ASFA's reasonable efforts are
excused. If the boys are Indian children, however, ICWA's active efforts
(in almost all states) are still mandated.
The facts above are based on a 2002 Alaska Supreme Court case,JS.
v. State.J. S. was an ICWA case in which a father's parental rights to his
three Indian boys were terminated after he sexually abused them.6 The
imprisoned father appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court, arguing that the
1. Mark Andrews, "Active" Versus "Reasonable" Efforts: The Duties to Reunify the Fam-
ily Under the Indian Child Welfare Act and the Alaska Child in Need ofAid Statutes, 19 ALasKA
L. REv. 85,85 (2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (2000); 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2000)).
2. Kathleen S. Bean, Reasonable Efforts: What State Courts Think, 36 U. TOL. L. REV.
321, 345-46 (2005).
3. Id. at 321-22 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (2000)).
4. Andrews, supra note 1, at 86 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2000)).
5. J.S. v. State, 50 P.3d 388, 389-90 (Alaska 2002).
6. Id.
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State had failed to provide him with active reunification services as re-
quired by the ICWA.7 The State countered, however, that the ICWA
should not be interpreted to require services in cases involving "aggra-
vated circumstances."" This Note addresses that conflict.
The term "aggravated circumstances," which is derived from the
ASFA, includes: abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, sexual abuse, or any
additional circumstances defined in a particular state as "aggravated." '9
When such circumstances exist, under the ASFA, states are free to termi-
nate parental rights without even considering a family service plan."° In
J.S., the Alaska Supreme Court sided with the State, and ruled that even
though the ICWA provided no exception to its active efforts requirement,
those efforts should nonetheless be excepted in cases of sexual abuse."
Three years after the Alaska decision, the South Dakota Supreme
Court addressed the same question in Ex rel.J.S.B.: whether ASFA's ag-
gravated circumstances exception should override the ICWA."2 There,
South Dakota reached the opposite result, holding that the ASFA did not
supersede the ICWA. The decision in J.S.B. prevented State courts in
South Dakota from summarily dismissing active efforts in ICWA cases,
even in the worst instances of abuse.13
Many observers hailed JS.B. as a victory for both the ICWA and
Indian Country. But others asked why. Why require active rehabilitative
services to parents in cases of severe sexual abuse, as in J.S., or chronic
substance abuse, as inJ.S.B.? Wouldn't children's lives be threatened if re-
united with dangerous parents?
Clearly influenced by these concerns, the Alaska Supreme Court
justified carving its exception largely on policy grounds. Indeed, why
should Alaska agencies consider treatment plans to parents in aggravated
circumstances? Contrastingly, when the South Dakota Supreme Court
refused to create such an exception, it relied less on policy and more on
commonly-accepted rules of statutory construction, as the ICWA pro-
vides no exception to its active efforts requirement.
This Note defendsJ.S.B. from a policy standpoint, arguing that absent
a carefully-crafted federal amendment, ASFA's aggravated circumstances
7. Id. at 391.
8. Id.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i) (2001). The ASFA also provides that services need
not be provided when a parent has "[1] committed murder ... of another child of the
parent; [2] committed voluntary manslaughter ... of another child of the parent; [3] aided
or abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit such a murder or such a voluntary
manslaughter; or [4] committed a felony assault that results in serious bodily injury to the
child or another child of the parent; or [5] ... the parental rights of the parent to a sibling
have been terminated involuntarily." 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii)-(iii).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) (15) (D) (i).
11. J.S. v. State, 50 P.3d 388, 392 (Alaska 2002).
12. Ex rel.J.S.B.,Jr., Minor Child, 691 N.W2d 611,617 (S.D. 2005).
13. Id. at 620.
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should not apply in ICWA cases. This position is bolstered not only by
the ICWA's history and purpose, as discussed inj.S.B., but also concerns
regarding ICWA compliance and the encompassing nature of the aggra-
vated circumstances exception. This Note further argues that the lack of
an exception will not endanger Indian children, nor is it unreasonable, as
the standard for determining what active efforts are required is necessarily
fact-specific and can be adjusted based on the circumstances.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the Indian Child Welfare
Act. The ICWA was enacted in response to a long history of federal and
state policies that targeted Native children and undermined their families.
The Act was designed to counter these policies by establishing certain
requirements for states before Native children could be removed. Notably,
the Act requires that states provide active efforts to Indian families prior
to foster care placements and parental rights terminations. In this way,
Congress sought to maintain Indian families where possible.
Part II briefly discusses the 1980 Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act (AACWA), which was the precursor to the ASFA. The
AACWA created the reasonable efforts requirement, which is the reunifi-
cation standard for non-Indians.
Part III discusses the 1997 Adoption and Safe Families Act, which
represented a departure from its predecessor, the AACWA. The ASFA,
among other things, allowed states to eliminate reasonable efforts to fami-
lies in aggravated circumstances. This section shows that the respective
histories, policy goals, and standards of the ICWA and ASFA are funda-
mentally different, so that one Act should not override the other.
Part IV examines the decisions in Alaska's JS. and South Dakota's
J.S.B. In JS., the Court held, almost entirely on policy grounds, that
ASFA's aggravated circumstances trumped ICWA's active efforts. InJS.B.,
the Court leaned more heavily on rules of statutory construction to rule
that the ASFA did not disturb the ICWA.
PartV argues thatJS.B. was the correct outcome, showing that the
open-ended character of the aggravated circumstances exception could
potentially stifle the active efforts requirement in Indian Country. Further,
this section argues that the result inJ.S.B. does not endanger Indian chil-
dren, as the requirements for active efforts are not fixed, and are adjustable
based on the circumstances.This section also shows that the ICWA and its
active efforts requirement remain important, as many of the problems that
led to its enactment persist today; notably, the high rate of Indian children
involved in the child welfare system.
PartVI then briefly examines the possibility of a federal amendment
incorporating a severe child abuse exception, and warns that such an ex-
ception, while desirable, should be carefully designed so not to
unnecessarily excuse state services to Native families.
[VOL. 13:433
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Finally, Part VII reviews options for states to revamp their active ef-
forts requirements to prevent the occurrence of aggravated circumstances
in the first place.
I.THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT
"IThere is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and in-
tegrity of Indian tribes than their children."14
The ICWA is likely "one of the most important and far-reaching
pieces of legislation protecting Indian tribes.""s It was enacted by Con-
gress in 1978 in response to the "rising concern ... over the consequences
to Indian children, Indian families, and Indian tribes of abusive [state and
federal] child welfare practices that resulted in the separation of large
numbers of Indian children from their families and tribes through adop-
tion and foster care placement."' 6 The ICWA, therefore, was designed:
to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote
the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the
establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of
Indian children from their families and the placement of such
children in foster or adoptive homes which [would] reflect the
unique values of Indian culture, and ... provid[e] ... assistance
to Indian tribes in the operation of child and family service
programs."
The ICWA's aim was thus to limit states' power to separate Indian
children from their parents, and also to provide affirmative services to help
preserve Native families.8
A. A Background
To appreciate the importance of ICWA's "minimum federal stan-
dards," it's crucial to understand the historical periods that led to its
enactment. Commonly referred to as the "Boarding and Mission School
Era" (1880s-1950s) and the "Indian Adoption Era" (1950s-1970s), these
14. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (2000).
15. Sheri L. Hazeltine, Speedy Termination of Alaska Native Parental Rights: The 1998
Changes to Alaska's Child in Need ofAid Statutes and Their Inherent Conflict with the Mandates
of the Federal Indian Child Welfare Act, 19 ALASKA L. REV. 57, 59 (2002).
16. INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT COMMISSION REPORT 9 (December 30, 2004), avail-
able at http://www.state.sd.us/oia/files/report.pdf [hereinafter South Dakota Report]
(quoting Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30,32 (1989)).
17. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2006) (emphasis added).
18. SOUTH DAKOTA REPORT, supra note 16, at 9.
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periods were marked by active government efforts to remove Indian chil-
dren from their families and assimilate them into the dominant White
culture. 9 It was a remarkable time, as "[p]robably never before in this
country has there been such a concerted effort to transform a group of
people by legally manipulating their children.
20
1. The Boarding and Mission School Era
The Boarding and Mission School Era began in the mid-nineteenth
century with progressive politicians, churchmen, and educators seeking to
better the lives of Indians by "raising" them into civilization." Although it
is contended that many of these early reformers were genuinely con-
cerned with achieving justice for Native people, the movement was
extremely ethnocentric. 2 To them, Indians needed saving, not only from
the government's oppression, but also from "tribal languages, values, relig-
ions, societal models, communal ownership of land, [and] the aboriginal
lifestyle."23
In 1867, the Commissioner of Indian Services declared to Congress
that the best way to "save" future generations of Native people was to
"separate the Indian children completely from their tribes. 2 4 What
followed was the establishment of boarding schools to assimilate Indian
children into the dominant Anglo culture. These boarding schools were
characterized by "military type discipline," and children were forbidden
from using their Native languages . 2 Reformers and government officials
were especially fond of the off-reservation boarding school, which
removed children from the influence of their aboriginal home environ-
ments for long periods of time.26
By 1900, more than twenty thousand children were attending In-
dian boarding schools, and during this time many Native parents lived in
terror that their children would be stolen away.27
19. Hazeltine, supra note 15, at 59-60.
20. SouTH DAKOTA REPORT, supra note 16, at 11. "I can remember (the welfare
worker) coming and taking some of my cousins and friends. I didn't know why and I
didn't question it. It was just done and it had always been done." H.R. RnP. No. 95-1386,
at 8 (1978).
21. See Hazeltine, supra note 15, at 59. ARRELL M. GIBsON, AMERICAN INDIAN: PRE-
HISTORY TO THE PEsErNr 491 (1980).
22. GIBSON, supra note 21, at 491.
23. Id.
24. H.R. REp. No. 104-808 (1996).
25. Id.
26. GIBSON, supra note 21, at 432.
27. Id.
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In typical bureaucratic fashion, to protect the annual
congressional appropriation of each school, agents and agency
police, even United States cavalry, every autumn seized
children and hauled them off to school, over their parents'
protests, thereby filling the quotas at each institution. Agents
punished uncooperative parents by placing them in the
reservation jail, or withholding their rations and annuities.28
Even as late as 1910, federal policies led to the kidnapping of Indian
children from their families. 29 For instance, "bonuses were used to encour-
age boarding school workers to take leave of absence and secure as many
students as possible from surrounding reservations.... [and] these 'kid
snatchers' received no guidelines regarding the means they could use.
30
And though Congress later addressed the kidnapping problem, Indian
boarding schools still flourished, and assimilation remained the govern-
ment's key focus through the 1950s.31 "The Indian children who lived at
these boarding schools were torn from their families, tribes, norms, beliefs,
language, religion, and ultimately, their sense of selves" as Indians.
32
2.The Indian Adoption Era
In the 1950s, as boarding schools waned, "the Bureau of Indian
Affairs ... became concerned about the number of Indian children" who
faced lives of poverty on the reservation. 33 This concern culminated in the
establishment of the Indian Adoption Project in 1959.3" "The Indian
Adoption Project was premised on the view that Indian children were
better cared for in non-Indian homes," and over 395 Indian children were
so placed within the first year. 35 The Indian Adoption Project's effect then
was to "place Indian children with Caucasian families far from the reser-
vation,"36 and throughout this period, "the adoption of Indian children
into non-Indian homes ... was widespread."3 It is also notable that little
attention was paid during this time "to providing services on reservations
that would strengthen and maintain Indian families.
38
28. Id.
29. H.R. REP. No. 104-808.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Hazeltine, supra note 15, at 60.
33. Id. at 61.
34. H.R. REP. No. 104-808 (1996).
35. Id.
36. Hazeltine, supra note 15, at 61
37. H.R. REP. No. 104-808.
38. id.
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3. The Call for Federal Legislation
By the 1970's, though some of the most blatant assimilation pro-
grams had ended, Indian children were still being removed from their
homes and tribes at very high rates. 9 Now, however, they were taken "by
[often] well-meaning [state] social workers" who had little to no knowl-
edge of tribal childrearing practices.4" The children were then placed by
state agencies in White homes.41
Tribes, alarmed by these trends, argued to Congress that removing
Indian children not only hurt tribes, but also the children themselves,
who were unable to develop a sense of "identity within [the] tribal net-
work."4 2 Tribal leaders maintained that Indian children were better off
with their families and Native communities, where they could form a
sense of Indian identity, which was important to the child's "emotional
and psychological well-being.
'4 3
Finally, in 1978, "after many years of congressional hearings, letters
to Congress, and studies showing the widespread and unnecessary re-
moval of Indian children," Congress passed the Indian Child Welfare Act."
The legislation directly addressed the "alarmingly high percentage" of
Indian children taken from their homes by non-Indian child welfare
workers, and who were then "placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive
homes and institutions."4 Congress found that "because of cultural differ-
ences and biases and the dominating authority of state courts, Indian
children were too easily removed from their families and tribes alto-
gether."46
Many of Congress's findings were listed in House Report 95-1386.
The report, which documented "surveys of states with large Indian popu-
lations ... in 1969 and again in 1974," was stunning.47 It "indicate[d] that
approximately 25-35 percent of all Indian children [were] separated from
their families and placed in foster homes, adoptive homes, or institu-
tions.'48 The Report also expressed "shock" at the disparity in placement
39. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2000).
40. Hazeltine, supra note 15, at 59.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 61-62.
43. Id. at 61.
44. Id. at 59.
45. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2000).
46. Richard B. Maltby, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 and the Missed Opportu-
nity to Apply the Act in Guardianships, 46 ST. Louis U. L.J. 213, 216 (2002).
47. H.R. RP. No. 95-1386, at 9 (1978).
48. Id. In Minnesota, the Report found that "one in every eight Indian children
under 18 years of age [was] living in an adoptive home; and, in 1971-72, nearly one in
every four Indian children under 1 year of age was adopted." Id.
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rates for Indian and non-Indian children.49 For example, Montana's ratio
of Indian foster-care placement "[was] at least thirteen times greater" than
its placement of non-Indian children."0 In "South Dakota, 40 percent of
all adoptions made by the State's Department of Public Welfare ... [were]
of Indian children, yet Indians [made] up only seven percent of the juve-
nile population."'" And "in sixteen states surveyed in 1969, approximately
85 percent of all Indian children in foster care were living in non-Indian
homes.
5 2
Congress was particularly concerned that the disproportionate rates
of parental rights terminations of Native families was caused by an insen-
sitivity to "Indian cultural values and social norms," leading to
misevaluations of parenting skills and to unequal considerations of such
matters as parental alcohol abuse. 3 Thus, Congress enacted the ICWA in
an effort to undo the cultural and familial mayhem wrought on tribes by
a century of discriminatory state and federal child welfare practices.
B. Requirements
The Indian Child Welfare Act was designed to prevent the unneces-
sary breakup of Indian families, and does so by granting special rights to
tribes and parents involved in child custody proceedings. 4 Among other
provisions, the ICWA: (1) establishes either exclusive or presumptive juris-
diction in tribal courts; (2) grants special intervention rights to Indian tribes;
(3) mandates that before an Indian parent's or custodian's rights to a child
can be terminated, a finding must be made that active efforts have been
made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family; and (4) guarantees that
no parental rights will be terminated without a finding beyond a reasonable
doubt that "continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custo-
dian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the
child."
The Act also establishes a hierarchy for foster care and adoptive
placement preferences for Indian children, putting the child "[first with] a
member of the child's extended family; [second with] other members of
the Indian child's tribe; or [third with] other Indian families." 6 These






53. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 10 (1978).
54. Hazeltine, supra note 15, at 62.
55. Ex rel.J.S.B.,Jr., Minor Child, 691 N.W2d 611, 616-17 (S.D. 2005) (citing 25
U.S.C. § 1911(a),(c) (2006); 25 U.S.C.§ 1912(d),(o) (2006)).
56. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (2006).
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C. Active Efforts
ICWA's active efforts requirement is unique in American law. It
contrasts, for example, with states' obligation to non-Indian families,
where only reasonable efforts are required to receive federal funds.17 The
active efforts requirement was designed to prevent the unnecessary
breakup of Indian families involved in child custody proceedings."' The
ICWA provides that:
any party seeking to effect a foster care placement of, or ter-
mination of parental rights to, an Indian child under State law
shall satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to
provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed
to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these ef-
forts have proved unsuccessful."' 9
House Report 1386 explained that before 1978 families were rarely
(if ever) provided remedial services prior to parental rights terminations.60
ICWA's active efforts thus required state agencies to take affirmative steps
to keep troubled Native families together,61 and, as mentioned above, there
is no exception to the active efforts mandate.
62
Although the Act does not directly define active efforts, 63 many
states have interpreted the provision to mean that caseworkers should
provide extra assistance, such as transportation assistance or culturally-
relevant services to Native families, and may spend more time trying to
reunify them.64 In Alaska, "active efforts have been interpreted to include
working with parents through each step of the reunification plan, rather
than requiring the parents to navigate the child welfare system on their
own. ' 6 The active efforts requirement thus serves an important function
in accomplishing ICWA's goal of maintaining and strengthening Native
families.
57. See U.S. GOV'T AccouNTABiLiTy OFFICE REP. 05-290, Indian Child Welfare Act:
Existing Information on Implementation Issues Could Be Used to Target Guidance And
Assistance to States (2005).
58. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d).
59. Id.
60. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 22 (1978).
61. Id.
62. Ex rel.J.S.B.,Jr., Minor Child, 691 N.W2d 611,617 (S.D. 2005).
63. Andrews, supra note 1, at 92.
64. U.S. GoV'T AccouNTABILITY OFFICE REP. 05-290, supra note 57.
65. Laverne E Hill, Family Group Conferencing: An Alternative Approach to the Placement
of Alaska Native Children under the Indian Child Welfare Act, 22 ALAsitA L. REV. 89, 102
(2005).
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II.THE ADOPTION ASSISTANCE AND CHILD WELFARE ACT
Two years following the passage of the ICWA, Congress passed The
Adoption Assistance and child Welfare Act of 1980.66 "The AACWA cre-
ated both the goal of reunification of non-Indian children with the family
and the 'reasonable efforts' requirement," which remains the federal stan-
dard.67 The AACWA provided that:
[i]n order for a State to be eligible for payments under this
part, it shall have a plan approved by the Secretary which ...
provides that . .. reasonable efforts shall be made to preserve
and reunify families-(i) prior to the placement of a child in
foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removing the
child from the child's home; and (ii) to make it possible for a
child to safely return to the child's home.
68
The AACWA required that these case plans include a plan of ser-
vices that would improve family conditions and facilitate returning
children to their homes. 69 The reasonable efforts requirement was thus the
beginning of a "second efforts test" that was separate from the reunifica-
tion requirements under the ICWA.
Specifically, reasonable efforts have been interpreted as requiring
services that are crafted to address the parents' problems that led to their
child being removed in the first place.71 Offered services vary by state and
can include anything from drug treatment to homemaker services 72 and
their aim is to rehabilitate parents so that their children might be returned
home.
III.THE ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT
Today, child custody law for non-Indians is governed chiefly by the
Adoption and Safe Families Act. The ASFA, enacted in 1997, represented
a departure from its predecessor, the AACWA. 73 "The new law was the
66. Andrews, supra note 1, at 107.
67. Id.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (Supp. 1999) (emphasis added).
69. Andrews, supra note 1, at 108.
70. See id.
71. See Bean, supra note 2, at 345.
72. Id. at 345-46. Examples of other services include: housing assistance, counseling,
transportation, parenting education, anger management classes, mental health care, child-
development classes, home visits by nurses, day care, referrals to medical care, domestic
violence counseling, financial management services, alcohol recovery support, stress man-
agement services, nutritional guidance, and arrangements for visitation. Id.
73. Hazeltine, supra note 15, at 64.
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congressional response to suggestions that the AACWA had resulted in
children languishing in foster care too long, or moving repeatedly without
finding a permanent home."7 4 Whereas the AACWA sought to protect the
best interests of children by providing remedial services to parents and
families, the ASFA subordinated the rights of parents and families "to the
[ultimate] ... concern for the health and safety of the child." 71 The ASFA
provides that when "determining reasonable efforts to be made with re-
spect to a child ... the child's health and safety shall be the paramount
concern."7 6 Notably, the ASFA maintained, but altered, AACWA's reason-
able efforts test 7 by excusing reasonable efforts in certain "aggravated
circumstances."78
A. The Aggravated Circumstances Exception
Under the ASFA and its implementing state statutes, social service
agencies are relieved from providing rehabilitative services to families
when aggravated circumstances are present.7 9 The rationale being that
state agencies should not waste state resources attempting to rehabilitate
parents when those parents have subjected their children to serious abuse
or neglect.8 " Specifically, the ASFA provides that:
reasonable efforts ... shall not be required to be made with re-
spect to a parent of a child if a court of competent jurisdiction
has determined that ... the parent has subjected the child to
aggravated circumstances (as defined in state law, which defini-
tion may include but need not be limited to abandonment,
torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse)[.]81
The aggravated circumstances exception was key to the ASFA's pas-
sage into law. A major criticism of the AACWA was the threat to the
health and safety of children when reasonable efforts were made to re-
unite them with dangerous parents. 2 This concern was voiced on the
Senate floor when the ASFA was debated in Congress. As Senator
DeWine argued:
74. Id.
75. In the Interest of D.B., III, Minor Child, 670 N.W 2d 67,70 (S.D. 2003).
76. 42 U.S.C. S 671(a)(15)(A).
77. See Bean, supra note 2, at 345.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i) (2003).
79. Ex rel. J.S.B., Jr., Minor Child, 691 N.W2d 611, 617 (S.D. 2005) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D) (2003)).
80. Id.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i) (2003).
82. Bean, supra note 2, at 326.
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Too often, reasonable efforts, as outlined in the statute, have
come to mean unreasonable efforts. It has come to mean ef-
forts to reunite families which are families in name only. I am
speaking now of dangerous, abusive adults who represent a
threat to the health and safety and even the lives of these chil-
dren. This law has been misinterpreted in such a way that no
matter what the particular circumstance of a household may
be, it is argued that the State must make reasonable efforts to
keep the family together and to put it back together if it falls
apart.... Clearly, the Congress of the United States in 1980
did not intend that children should be forced back into the
custody of adults who are known to be dangerous and known
to be abusive. 3
The ASFA, by excusing rehabilitative services in aggravated circum-
stances, answered these criticisms.84 The term "aggravated circumstances"
was left mostly vague to be defined by the states, and this ambiguity, as
explained later, led to a clash between the ICWA and the ASFA.
B. ICWA vs. ASFA
The ICWA and ASFA are fundamentally different, their distinctions
evident in their respective policy goals and standards.
1. Policy Distinctions
Congress's motivations in enacting the ICWA and ASFA were poles
apart in most respects.While the ICWA sought to ensure the best interests
of Indian children by maintaining and strengthening their familial, tribal,
and cultural ties, the "ASFA identifie[d] 'permanency' as a major consid-
eration in promoting the best interests of children."85 The ASFA
accomplishes its goal of permanency by, among other things, making it
easier to terminate parental rights to "free" up children for adoption. 6
Thus the result of the ASFA has been to greatly increase the number of
parental rights terminations generally." For instance, after the Alaska legisla-
ture redrafted its child custody laws to comply with the ASFA in 1998,"the
number of statewide parental rights termination proceedings more than
doubled, and the number of [actual] terminations ... increased dramatically:
83. Hazeltine, supra note 15, at 65 (citing 143 CONG. Risc. S.12669 (1997) (Com-
ments of Sen. DeWine).
84. Id. at 64.
85. Ex rel.J.S.B.,Jr., Minor Child, 691 N.W2d 611,617 (S.D. 2005).
86. Hazeltine, supra note 15, at 76.
87. Id.
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151 parental rights terminations in 1997; 210 in 1998; 260 in 1999; and
564 in 2000.88
Furthermore, many states have interpreted the ASFA as limiting
states' responsibility to provide reunification efforts, which has meant that
state agencies have reduced the rehabilitative services they offer.89 As the
New Jersey Supreme Court summarized, "[o]n the federal level, the re-
cent trend has been to limit the reasonable efforts social service agencies
must undertake to reunite families." '
These trends stand in stark contrast to the policy goals of the ICWA,
which were aimed at rehabilitating and preserving Native families."
Whereas the ASFA was enacted to promote adoption and permanency,
the ICWA is instead part of a "congressional 'restitution policy,'" enacted
to help maintain and repair Native families and communities after a cen-
tury of government actions aimed at destroying them.9 2
Furthermore, the ICWA demands a more complex look at the best
interests of Indian children. As one observer noted, the concept of best
interests in ICWA cases requires looking not only at the child's psycho-
logical bond with the parent, but also considering the interests of the
family and the community." The ICWA acknowledges that Indian child-
rearing is unique.94 In enacting the ICWA, Congress made findings that
the best interests of Indian children were inextricably linked with the
welfare of their families and tribes." So while the health and safety of the
child is clearly crucial, the child's best interests may not necessarily be best
served by a swift termination of parental rights.96
2. A Higher Threshold
ICWA's active efforts and ASFA's reasonable efforts are separate
standards, and while both provisions aim to rehabilitate families, ICWA's
88. Id. at 70.
89. See Bean, supra note 2, at 334.
90. Id. (citing In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 736 A.2d 1261, 1273 (N.J. 1999).
91. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2000).
92. Maltby, supra note 46, at 215.
93. See id. at 218-19.
94. Id. at 217.
95. See id. at 217-18.
96. Studies showed that Indian children often suffered emotional harm as a result of
being taken from Indian families and placed in white homes where they lost their sense of
"Indian" (and overall) identity. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 33
(1989) (quoting Indian Child Welfare Program: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of
the Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93rd Cong. 46 (1974) (statement of Dr. Joseph
Westermeyer, Dep't of Psychiatry, Univ. of Minn.).
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active efforts demand a more assertive approach.9 7 As Iowa law has inter-
preted it, active efforts require "a [more] vigorous and concerted level of
casework beyond the level that typically constitutes reasonable efforts.""
Iowa law further provides that "reasonable efforts shall not be construed as
active efforts.""9
In Alaska, the courts have adopted three substantive distinctions be-
tween active and reasonable efforts. One scholar summarized Alaska's
active efforts standard as:
affirmative effort[s] to offer programs and services to facilitate
reunification; as simply stating the need for the parent to take
advantage of and making the parent aware of such services is
insufficient. Second, 'active efforts' is a more stringent standard
than 'reasonable efforts.' Finally, there is a distinctly Indian
character to active efforts; therefore, the State must search for
reunification services uniquely offered by the Indian commu-
nity itself.'"
Since the ICWA's overall goal is family preservation, these intensive
family reunification requirements make sense.
Another important distinction between the two Acts, of course, is
that the ICWA provides no exception to the active efforts requirement.
IV STATE LITIGATION
The ICWA demands that states make active efforts findings in all
cases, even in aggravated circumstances. This has been controversial. In
fact, the requirement has been challenged in several states, perhaps most
notably in Alaska and South Dakota.
A. TheJ.S. Decision
Inj.S. v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court held that ICWA's active ef-
forts were not required to an Indian father after he was convicted of
sexually abusing his three sons.' °' The abuse inJ.S. was severe. 12 The trial
97. Gordon E. Limb,Toni Chance & Eddie F Brown, An Empirical Examination of the
Indian Child Welfare Act and its Impact on Cultural and Familial Preservation for American Indian
Children, 28 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 1279, 1283 (2004).
98. Jerry R. Foxhoven, The Iowa Indian Child Welfare Act: Clarification and Enhance-
ment of the FederalAct, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 53,71 (2005) (citing IowA CODE § 232B.5(19)).
99. Id.
100. Andrews, supra note 1, at 87.
101. J.S. v. State, 50 P.3d 388,388 (Alaska 2002).
102. See id. at 389-90.The father was convicted of four counts of first degree sexual
abuse, which included charges of both digital and penile penetration. Id.
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court sentenced him to nineteen years in prison with four years sus-
pended, and the Alaska Court of Appeals affirmed. 11
3
With the father in prison, the State petitioned for the termination of
his parental rights to his three boys, and the trial court ruled beyond a
reasonable doubt that the terminations were appropriate. 0 4 The court also
found, however, that the State failed to offer any remedial or rehabilitative
services as required by the ICWA. °0 In response, the State developed a
case plan that required the father to admit to the charges of his indict-
ment, take responsibility for his behavior, write a letter of apology to each
of his three sons, direct his attorneys to terminate his appeals, and enroll
and be accepted into a sex offender treatment program.0 6 The father re-
fused to admit his guilt or cease his appeals, and thus rejected the plan.'7
The trial court then found that active efforts were satisfied, and the fa-
ther's rights to his three sons were terminated."8
The father appealed the terminations to the Alaska Supreme Court,
arguing that the State's case plan didn't satisfy ICWA's active efforts.0 9 The
State countered that active efforts were met, and further argued that even
if they were not met, ICWA should not be interpreted as requiring active
efforts "once a family is irrevocably sundered by parental sexual abuse." ''1
In addressing the question, the Court initially observed that the
State's duty under the active efforts requirement is not affected by a par-
ent's motivation or prognosis before remedial efforts have commenced."'
Thus, no matter how dire the circumstances of abuse, or weak the pros-
pects for reunification, active efforts are never summarily excused.
Nevertheless, the Alaska Supreme Court ruled that active efforts were not
required, and justified its departure from the ICWA with the ASFA." 2
[The ASFA] convinces us that it is the policy of Congress to
not require remedial measures in situations where a court has
determined that a parent has subjected his or her child to sex-
ual abuse ... [and] [a]lthough this case is not governed by
ASFA, that act is useful in providing guidance to congressional
policy on child welfare issues. It suggests that in situations of
adjudicated devastating sexual abuse, such as this one, a person's




107. Id. at 390-91.




112. Id. at 392.
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fundamental right to parent is not more important than a
child's fundamental right to safety."'
The Court then held that ASFA's aggravated circumstances trumped
ICWA's active efforts in cases of sexual abuse.'
B. The J.S.B. Decision
Almost three years later, the South Dakota Supreme Court ad-
dressed the same question. The Court there, though, reached the opposite
result.
J.S.B. involved a young boy, J.S.B., who was eligible for membership
in both the Oglala Sioux and Cheyenne River Sioux Tribes. Born in
1999,J.S.B. had been removed from his parents three times by 2002.15 He
was first adjudicated abused and neglected in 2000, after an investigation
confirmed that the mother had been using both marijuana and alcohol
and that the father had left J.S.B. in his mother's care.1 1 6 There was also
evidence of past domestic violence and chemical dependency.'
The Department of Social Services ("DSS") provided various ser-
vices to the father, including anger management classes and parenting
lessons, until he gained full legal custody of J.S.B. in 2001. 18 During the
next year, J.S.B.'s father cared for him, purchased a home, and was gain-
fully employed." 9 J.S.B.'s father also "took J.S.B. to sweats and sun dances,
ensuring that J.S.B. would be acquainted with tribal ways and ceremo-
nies." 2' But J.S.B.'s father again lost custody to him in 2002 when he was
found highly intoxicated and walking down the street with J.S.B. lagging
sixty to seventy feet behind, the father "yelling at J.S.B., age two, to keep
up with him.'"1 21 DSS then contacted the mother and gave her physical
custody.1 22 Shortly after, though, the mother was arrested for driving un-
der the influence, and DSS placed J.S.B. in foster care. 2'
After a series of unsuccessful communications between DSS and
J.S.B.'s father, an abuse and neglect petition was filed in August 2002.1
2
The petition alleged that the ASFA applied and rehabilitative services
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Ex rel.J.S.B.,Jr., Minor Child, 691 N.W2d 611,613-14 (S.D. 2005).





121. Id. at 613-14.
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were not required. 2M Then, in a December 2002 hearing, the trial court
agreed that the ASFA "applie[d] and [DSS was] under no obligation to
provide services to try and reunite the minor child with his parents.'
' 26
Finally, at the final dispositional hearings in 2003, the court terminated
the rights of both parents, and found that (1) DSS had made reasonable
and active efforts in the case, and (2) that ASFA applied.' 21 J.S.B.'s father
appealed the termination to the South Dakota Supreme Court, arguing,
among other things, that the trial court erred when it held that the ASFA
overruled provisions of the ICWA.1
28
The South Dakota Supreme Court upheld the trial court's termina-
tion of the father's parental rights, and also upheld its finding that DSS
had made reasonable and active efforts.1 29 But the Court rejected the
lower court's conclusion that the ASFA superseded the ICWA.1"° As the
Court explained, Congress had "assumed the responsibility for the protec-
tion and preservation of Indian tribes and their resources," 3 ' and that
ICWA's policy goals were different from the ASFA's. 1 2 Whereas the
ICWA sought to ensure that Indian children "retain[ed] familial, tribal,
and cultural ties," '' the ASFA identified permanency as a major consid-
eration, and thus excused states from providing services in circumstances
where reunification seems doubtful. 13 4 Unlike the ASFA, the Court ex-
plained, the ICWA provides no exception to its active efforts obligation. 3 '
The Court then turned to the State's contention that ASFA's aggra-
vated circumstances should nonetheless trump the ICWA. The State
specifically cited two South Dakota statutory provisions that excused rea-
sonable efforts to families. These included "a parent who [1] [h]as a
documented history of abuse and neglect associated with chronic alcohol
or drug abuse," and [2] a parent who "[h]as exposed the child to or dem-
onstrated an inability to protect the child from substantial harm or the
risk of substantial harm ... [and] the child or another child has been re-
moved from the parent's custody because the removed child was
adjudicated abused and neglected by a court on at least one previous oc-
125. Id.
126. Id. at 615.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 621.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 616.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 617.
135. Id.
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casion."'36 The State argued that under these provisions active efforts
should be excused.
137
The Court disagreed, explaining that the ICWA clearly offered no
exception to the active efforts requirement, and then applied well-
accepted rules of statutory construction that dictated that the ICWA pro-
visions control.
138
The State also pointed to Alaska's decision in J. S. v. State, arguing
that the decision there lent support to the conclusion that the ASFA
modified the ICWA.'39 But the South Dakota Court "respectfully dis-
agree[d] with the Alaska Supreme Court"'4I noting that the Court itself
had acknowledged that the ASFA was not controlling in an ICWA case,
and that its remarks on the point were "dicta"' 4' The J.S.B. Court then
held that since "ASFA [did] not override ICWA .. . that the trial court
erred in ruling that DSS was relieved of making active efforts to reunite
J.S.B. with his father.'14
2
C. Reaction toJ.S.B.
Many who followed J.S.B. in Indian Country applauded the deci-
sion. One activist quoted in Oklahoma's Native American Times called the
case a victory both for the Indian Child Welfare Act and for "Indian peo-
ple who are trying to keep families together." ' 3
Support forJ.S.B., however, wasn't necessarily reflective of the belief
that every Indian parent, no matter the circumstances, should get a second
chance. Indeed, the intervening tribes in JS.B only joined the father on
the issue of whether the ASFA superseded the ICWA, and not in his
second contention that DSS's efforts were not "active" as required by the
ICWA. 144 This is despite the fact that DSS's efforts arguably were not
active.'45 Instead,JS.B. was likely hailed as a victory because it prevented
136. Id. at 618 (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 26-8A-21.1).
137. Id. at 619.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 620.
141. Id. at 619-20.
142. Id. at 620.
143. Ruth Steinberger, Victims of South Dakota Injustice Speak Out, NATIVE AMERICAN
TIMES, Jan. 26, 2005, at 8. Sandy White Hawk, founder of First Nations Orphan Associa-
tion, called the decision "an answer to our people's prayers." Id. Ms. White Hawk further
explained that "[a]s Indian people we are aware of what our families struggle with and we
are recovering from a history of near destruction of our extended Indian families." Id.
144. J.S.B., 691 N.W2d at 615.
145. See id. See also Ruth Steinberger, Two Indian Child Wefare Cases Come Down on
Side of Indians, NATIVE AMERICAN TIMES, January 12, 2005, available at http://
www.laborlawtalk.com/archive/index.php/t-12825.html. Steinberger quotes Peg Eagan,
attorney for the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe in J.S.B., arguing that "active efforts were
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an ICWA exception that would have done violence to the active efforts
requirement, and weakened the Act itself by making it vulnerable to
future state exceptions.
VJ.SB. WAS THE CORRECT OUTCOME
Judicial awareness and the continued viability of the ICWA are cru-
cial, as "[i]ts mere existence naturally forces judicial recognition of Native
American concerns."'46 J.S.B. was the correct outcome because it prohib-
ited state-defined exceptions to active efforts that could have severely
limited that provision's potency.
A. The Problem with Aggravated Circumstances
Whether ASFA's encompassing view of aggravated circumstances is
good policy for troubled families is debatable. However, allowing state
courts to deny rehabilitative services so easily in ICWA cases is certainly
not appropriate.
The primary concern is that the definition of "aggravated circum-
stances" is amorphous. The ASFA explicitly lists "abandonment",
"torture", "chronic abuse", and "sexual abuse" as examples of aggravated
circumstances, but does not define those terms. 47 Further, states can create
any additional aggravated circumstances they deem necessary.14 The result
has been a laundry list of aggravated circumstances used throughout the
U.S., some that fall particularly hard on American Indians."'
not made to the level that they could or should have been. But the important thing is that
the ruling was not allowed to stand...."). Id.
146. Maltby, supra note 46, at 220.
147. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 671 (2000).
148. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i) (2000).
149. See NATIONAL CONGRESS OF STATE LEGISLATrRES, Child Welfare: Aggravated Cir-
cumstances, available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/aggravat.htm. The NCSL lists
dozens of categories of aggravated circumstances utilized by various states, including:
"abandonment"; "torture"; "chronic abuse"; "physical abuse"; "assault or battery"; "rape,
sexual assault or other sexual abuse"; "parental substance abuse"; "failure to comply with
or make progress under treatment plan"; "parent cannot be located after diligent search";
"mental illness or deficiency precluding parent from caring for child, even with services";
"child previously removed due to physical or sexual abuse, was returned and has now been
removed again because of physical or sexual abuse"; "serious or chronic neglect"; "child
removed on at least two prior occasions"; "services offered, and parent still unable to pro-
tect child"; "parental incarceration or institutionalization"; "mental or emotional abuse";
"child conceived during sex offense"; "kidnapping or abduction of child"; "parent declines
services"; "crimes generally"; "another child physically or sexually abused or assaulted";
"general descriptors of conduct or harm"; "violent crimes against parent of child"; "other
crimes or status"; and "court discretion." Id.
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Notably, six states excuse services based on a parent's abuse of drugs
or alcohol and based on their refusal or failure of treatment.15 South
Dakota, for example, excuses services when a parent "has a documented
history of abuse and neglect associated with chronic alcohol or drug
abuse."'' Since substance abuse is widespread in Indian Country, and 70-
90 percent of child abuse cases there involve alcohol,'5 2 South Dakota's
provision could potentially eviscerate the active efforts requirement. In-
deed, as noted by the Oglala Sioux Tribe inj.S. B., a mere examination of
ICWA cases argued before the South Dakota Supreme Court show nu-
merous instances where a parent's alcohol dependence was the principal
basis for the removal of children.' 3 And since the ICWA was enacted to
protect Indian families from state abuses, it makes little sense to allow
states to so easily ignore ICWA's requirements.' 4
150. M.J. Hannett, Lessening the Sting of ASFA: The Rehabilitation-Relapse Dilemma
Brought about by Drug Addiction and Termination of Parental Rights, 45 FAM. CT. REv. 524,526
(2007). These states include: California (CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(b)(13) (West
1998 & Supp. 2008); Kentucky (Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.127(5); 600.020(1)(c) (Lex-
isNexis 2005)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-02; 27-20-32.2 (LexisNexis
2006)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.419(2)(c) (LexisNexis 2002)); Oklahoma
(OKLA. STAT.ANN. tit. 10, § 7003-4.6(A)(13) (West 1998 & Supp. 2006)); and South Dakota
(S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-21.1 (2004)). Hannett, supra, at 534 n.12. Even more alarm-
ing, as mentioned above, the NCSL survey lists fourteen states that allow aggravated
circumstances findings at the "court's discretion." NATIONAL CONGRESS OF STATE LEGISLA-
TUREs, supra note 149.
151. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-21.1(6) (2004).
152. CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA HEALTH ScI-
ENCES CENTER, IHS/BIA CHILD PROTECTION HANDBOOK 4 (2005), available at http://
devbehavpeds.ouhsc.edu/assets/pdf/CPT/relationship %20betwn%20ca%20&/ 2sa-ppt.pdf.
153. Intervenor Oglala Sioux Tribe's Brief at 23, Ex rel.j.S.B.,Jr., Minor Child, 691
N.W2d 611 (S.D. 2005) (No. 22907), 2003 WL 24009010 (citing In the Interest of D.B., II,
Minor Child, 670 N.W 2d 67 (S.D. 2003); ex rel. D.M., 661 N.W2d 768 (N.D. 2003); ex
tel. S.G.VE., 34 N.W2d 88 (S.D. 2001); In re S.D., 402 N.W2d 346, 346 (S.D. 1987).The
Oglala Sioux Tribe argued that if the aggravated circumstances exception had been applied
here, these "parents would not have been entitled to active efforts to rehabilitate them."
Intervenor Oglala Sioux Tribe's Brief at 23, Ex rel. j.S.B.,Jr., Minor Child, 691 N.W2d
611 (S.D. 2005) (No. 22907), 2003 WL 24009010. Peg Eagan, attorney for the Cheyenne
River Sue Tribe, predicted that hadJS.B. allowed South Dakota's substance abuse provi-
sion to trump ICWA's active efforts, it would certainly have increased the number of
parental rights terminations of Indian parents. Steinberger, supra note 145.
154. "Contributing to the problem [that led to ICWA's passage was] the failure of
State officials, agencies, and procedures to take into account the special problems and cir-
cumstances of Indian families and the legitimate interest of the Indian tribe in preserving
and protecting the Indian family as the wellspring of its own future." Miss. Band of Choc-
taw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 45 n.18 (1989) (quoting 124 CONG. REc. 38103
(1978) (letter from Rep. Udall)).
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B. The Safety of Indian Children
Would a judicially-created aggravated circumstances exception pro-
tect Indian children? Does the lack of one endanger them? The answer to
both questions is no. Just as in non-Indian cases, when an Indian child is
removed from her parents, Courts make fact-specific, careful determina-
tions before reuniting them. Nothing in the active efforts provision, or the
ICWA itself, requires that courts reunite children with dangerous parents.
Instead, the active efforts standard serves as a procedural safeguard to en-
sure that state courts give extra consideration, and, where possible and
appropriate, additional services, to Native families.
It is important to note that there is no single standard for active ef-
forts.15 The types of services offered, and the extent to which they are
offered, vary widely. A parent's situation, whether they are incarcerated,
severely mentally ill, or generally unwilling to participate in treatment,
will obviously play a role in determining the sufficiency of the state's ser-
vices. 1 6j. S.B., again, provides a helpful example.
There, the father argued that the services provided by DSS fell far
short of the active efforts required by ICWA.157 In analyzing the challenge,
the Court explained that "[w]hether DSS complied with the 'active ef-
forts' requirement of ICWA is a mixed question of fact and law.'" '58 The
Court then reviewed DSS's history with the father, and found that the
social worker did provide active efforts under the circumstances. 59 The
Court found that DSS had attempted to contact the father several times,
but was hindered by the fact that he had "voluntarily absented himself
and could not be located."1 60 The father admitted that he had been on the
reservation for several months and had not contacted DSS, and that he
was later arrested.1 61 A DSS social worker then met the father in prison,
and offered him a "Family Services Agreement," which he signed. 62 The
father then failed to meet the requirements of the agreement, and ap-
155. Andrews, supra note 1, at 92.
156. See e.g., A.M. v. State, 891 P2d 815 (Alaska 1995) (holding that doubtful pros-
pects of reunification are no excuse for not providing active efforts, but incarceration, or a
parent's non-responsiveness can be taken into account), overruled on other grounds; In re
Nicole B, 927 A.2d 1194 (Md. 2007) (ruling that the active efforts required to a mentally
ill Indian mother depended not only on the particular facts of the case, but also on what
resources the State Department has). See also Andrews, supra note 1, at 95 (explaining that
in Alaska, courts have generally found that the active efforts standard was met when the
Department offered services but the parent showed an unwillingness to accept parental
duties).
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peared at a later review hearing intoxicated."3 The Court then held that
"when [active] efforts prove to be 'unsuccessful,' they are no longer re-
quired." 161
Arguably, DSS's efforts were not active,6' as the services there were
neither very assertive nor culturally relevant. Still,J.S.B. serves as an ex-
ample of how courts take several factors into account to determine what
active efforts are appropriate under the circumstances.
Of course, one concern is that state agencies will reduce services too
frequently, effectively short-changing Native families by claiming more
often than necessary that active efforts would be futile. A similar issue has
been raised in the ASFA context.166 As one Court of Appeals warned,
"'the appearance of futility may be furthered by agency acts or omis-
sions'" and thus trial courts should "'be cautious in finding that
reasonable efforts would have been futile where an agency ignores a natu-
ral parent."67 This illustrates that even without an aggravated
circumstances exception, state trial courts and agencies still wield signifi-
cant control in the process. The lack of an exception, perhaps then, at the
very least, forces state courts to think harder about ICWA's active efforts,
which in itself is a positive outcome.
C. The Continued Need for the ICWA, Active Efforts
J.S.B. is still the only state high court to rebuff the contention that
the ASFA superseded certain provisions in the ICWA. Had the State pre-
vailed injS.B., the active efforts requirement would have been weakened,
and the ICWA itself would have become more vulnerable to future state
exceptions. The ICWA remains important because many of the problems
that led to its enactment are still prevalent; notably, the high rate of Indian
children involved in the child welfare system.
Today, Indian children are nearly three times as likely to be placed in
out-of-home care than Caucasian children. 68 In Alaska, where the situa-
tion is particularly bad, nearly one in ten Indian children are reported to
the State as possibly mistreated.1 69 Alaska records further show that in
1996, half of the children taken from their parents were Indian, although
163. Id.
164. Id. at 621.
165. Steinberger, supra note 145 (Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe attorney arguing that
services offered to D.B.'s father were not active enough).
166. Bean, supra note 2, at 340.
167. Id. (quoting In re Norris, Nos. 00CA038, OOCA041, 2000 WL 33226187, at *5
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2000)).
168. Casey Family Programs, Child Welfare Fact Sheets, http://www.casey.org/
MediaCenter/MediaKit/FactSheet.htm.
169. Lisa Demer, Focus Falls on Native Kids-Foster Care: They are Far More Likely than
Whites to be Taken from Parents, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 1,2002, at B1.
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Indians make up only a quarter of the population,'7 ° and as of July 1,
2002, that proportion jumped to sixty percent.'7'
If properly enforced, ICWA's active efforts could help curb these
trends. Scholars, though, note that states often don't increase their efforts
on behalf of Indian parents.'72 Indeed, the evidence indicates that the
ICWA is now, and has always been, "the victim of entrenched state court
hostility."'73 ICWA workers continually complain that state welfare agen-
cies either (1) do not know about ICWA requirements, (2) know about
the requirements, but do not increase their efforts, or (3) intentionally
ignore the requirements.'7 4 Reports of cultural bias, too, continue to
emerge. "I
And among the many under-enforced ICWA provisions, the active
efforts requirement has been particularly neglected. In a recent Govern-
ment Accountability Office survey, several tribal leaders complained that
"state caseworkers simply refer parents to services without providing any
additional assistance, essentially providing the same level of services as they
would for a non-American Indian family."
17 6
Precedents like J.S.B. are helpful, then, because they demand that
states at the very least pay attention to the ICWA and active efforts.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 1, at 85 (arguing that the Alaska Supreme Court
"has consistently applied a single standard for both active and reasonable efforts").
173. Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a New
Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587, 587 (2002).
174. U.S. GOV'T ACCoUNTABILITY OFFICE RP. 05-290. See also Steinberger, supra note
143 ("[w]e see time and time again where the states do not recognize [the ICWA] as a
federal law .... We observe in court, and hear social workers treat ICWA as if it were a
minor obstacle that they have to get around for child placement. We are still trying to
educate judges, lawmakers and social workers that ICWA was put in place to preserve and
bring back our extended family system that was nearly destroyed through adoption and
foster care.") (quoting Sandy White Hawk).
175. Demer, supra note 169, at B1. One state social worker in Alaska called a Native
family's home messy because of drying fish, laundry hanging in the living room, and pup-
pies on the porch, said Jamison Cole of the Eklutna Center, which works with Native
families involved with the Division of Family and Youth Services. Id; See also STATE OF
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF HuMAN SERVICES, REPORT FROM THE MICHIGAN ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON THE OVERREPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN OF COLOR IN CHILD WELFARE 20
(2006) [hereinafter Michigan Report] (recommending that state social workers undergo
additional cultural sensitivity training to decrease the high outplacement of minority chil-
dren in general).
176. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REP. 05-290 (2005), Indian Child Welfare
Act: Existing Information on Implementation Issues Could be Used to Target Guidance
And Assistance to States.
[VOL. 13:433
The Indian Child Welfare Act
VI.AMENDING THE ICWA
While judicially-created exceptions are clearly problematic, a federal
aggravated circumstances amendment to the ICWA could potentially pro-
vide a better solution. Federal legislators should tread carefully, however,
to avoid undermining active efforts. First, tribes should be consulted to
gain an understanding of what exceptions should be included, and what
exceptions could potentially be too broad (e.g., chronic alcohol abuse).
Further, any exceptions should include strict federal definitions, which
would avoid the problem of states providing their own over-inclusive
ones. A federal amendment, then, containing carefully selected and strictly
defined exceptions, would allow states to automatically forego treatment
in truly heinous instances of abuse as inj.S., and yet require services when
an Indian family could still be assisted. Any amendment less carefully
crafted, however, could lead to problems.
For instance, if Congress excluded all state exceptions and simply
applied those explicitly listed in the federal ASFA (e.g., abandonment,
torture, chronic abuse, sexual abuse, etc.), without defining those terms,
active efforts could be subverted. This is because, as mentioned above, the
exceptions listed in the ASFA were left vague to be defined by states.'77
Thus, terms like "chronic abuse" would inevitably become an umbrella
for situations of "chronic parental substance abuse," and therefore still al-
low states to summarily dismiss treatment in cases where families might
still be helped. Any federal amendment then should involve tribal input,
and include only carefully-defined federal terms.
VII. THE FUTURE OF ACTIVE EFFORTS
In 2005, the State of Michigan appointed a special advisory commit-
tee to gather data regarding the disproportionate representation of
minorities in the child welfare system."' The committee found that Indian
children, as well as other minorities, were still largely overrepresented. 9
The Committee then developed several recommendations which it submit-
ted to the State Legislature. 8 ' These included, among others, 1) the
expansion of "innovative prevention and family support programs" to mi-
nority families, and 2) ensuring "culturally proficient practices" among State
social workers."
AsJS.B. influences other states, and the active efforts provision be-
comes more difficult to ignore, the challenge for states and tribes, as the
177. Bean, supra note 2, at 338.
178. MICnGAN REPORT, supra note 175, at 1.
179. Id. at 3.
180. Id. at 5.
181. Id.
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State of Michigan recognized, will be to develop more effective, culturally
relevant services. Active efforts shouldn't only go so far as assertive treat-
ment programs to parents. Instead, they should be as ambitious and
creative as the ICWA itself, operating to both prevent aggravated circum-
stances from occurring, and serving families when the worst cases do
emerge.
To prevent the occurrence of aggravated circumstances, states and
tribes might begin by focusing services at the front-end of the child wel-
fare system.'8 2 The Cook Inlet Tribal Council in Alaska exemplifies this
approach."8 3 Council workers there serve as the first responders to some
minor reports made to Alaska welfare agencies involving Native chil-
dren. 84 In the past, some of these reports, usually involving neglect, were
shelved by State agencies without anyone checking.8" "The families later
may have experienced even worse problems."' 8 6 Now, according to Coun-
cil records, "about 450 families have gotten assessments and help through
the program,"' 7 which seeks to bolster families with "housing, counseling,
job opportunities-all areas of their life."' 8  The "main goal is to try to
keep the family intact."'89 By addressing domestic problems at the front-
end, the Cook program has successfully assisted and preserved Native
families, which is consistent with the ICWA's goals.
The types of services offered should also be carefully considered.
Family group conferencing, for one, has been suggested as a front-end
service that could help rehabilitate troubled Native families.90 Family
group conferencing allows the extended family and tribal community
members to come together to discuss the wellbeing of the child, which
incorporates the near-universal indigenous understanding that everyone
182. See Mimi Laver, Reconciling ASFA and ICWA, 21 ABA CHILD LAW PRACTICE 91
(2002-03). "As in any child welfare case, frontloading services to the family improves the
chances of a safe and permanent reunification. In the case of an Indian child, finding .cul-
turally appropriate services and delivering them promptly is an important part of
providing active efforts to the child and her family and increases the chance of an agree-
able permanent outcome." Id.






189. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
190. Hill, supra note 65, at 90. The 2004 South Dakota ICWA Commission reported
that the state and at least two tribes have recently entered into agreements to implement
"Group Family Decision Making to families involved with Child Protection Services"
South Dakota Report, supra note 16, at 93.The goal is to "facilitate the preservation and
stability of families by providing a forum for families to make plans that are designed to
ensure the safety, permanency, and well-being of their children and youth when the child
has entered or is at risk of entering the child welfare system." Id.
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shares responsibility for children.' This holistic approach is seen by many
as running counter to the existing adversarial child welfare system. 192
It is sad, though, that truly heinous abuse can never be fully pre-
vented, and in some cases, like J.S., states will confront situations where
services to a parent will do little to maintain the Indian family. In those
situations, as discussed above, state courts will create their own construc-
tive exceptions to active efforts by claiming that services would be futile.
But interestingly, even in many of those instances, active efforts can still be
reasonably maintained by shifting services to other Indian family members,
as opposed to excusing them. As one scholar suggested:
[S]ince ICWA and Indian cultures define family as much
broader than just parents and children, ICWA would not re-
quire active efforts to parents who are incapable of safely
caring for the child, but may require that those efforts be tar-
geted at other family members who may be more appropriate.
Under ICWA, preserving families is not always the same thing
as preserving parental rights.'93
By shifting services to other extended family members, and thus
preventing the breakup of the Indian family, the overall purpose of the
ICWA is served.
CONCLUSION
The lack of an aggravated circumstances, exception in the ICWA
will not cause Indian children to be reunified with dangerous parents. As
demonstrated in J S. B., a judicial determination of the sufficiency of ac-
tive efforts is inherently fact-specific, and courts have an obligation to
keep dangerous parents apart from their children in any event.
The lack of an exception, instead, strengthens the ICWA and its
goals. It safeguards and bolsters active efforts, and forces state courts to
take better notice of the ICWA, a federal Act wholly separate from the




193. Laver, supra note 182, at 91 (emphasis added).
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